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Abstract
In this note I specify the class of functions that are equilibria of
symmetric ﬁrst-price auctions.
1 Introduction
Suppose we somehow obtained a bidding function b( ). It could, for example,
be originated from some laboratory auction or be a linear interpolation of
some auction data. Is this bidding function theoretically possible? If so,
does it come from a model adequate to the situation at hand? In this paper
I study this problem in a sealed bid ﬁrst-price auction set up. To be more
concrete we are in the independent private values model and suppose we have
3 bidders with signals in the interval [0,1] and that our estimated bidding
function is b(x) = x
2. If the distribution of signals is uniform with three
bidders the equilibrium is b∗ (x) = 2x
3 . With two bidders the equilibrium is
exactly b∗ (x) = x
2. Do we have a dummy bidder? Colusion? Here I focus on
the distribution of signals. The uniform distribution that we supposed in this
example is usually used more for convenience than for theoretical reasons. In
this example if we change the distribution to F (x) =
√
x we have that the
equilibrium bidding function is exactly b(x). I show in this paper that for
any number of bidders and pratically any strictly increasing function b( ) it
is possible to ﬁnd a strictly increasing continuous distribution function such
that the equilibrium bidding function is exactly b( ). This result is similar in
spirit to the Sonneschein-Mantel-Debreu theorem on excess demand. I also
analyze a second aspect of this problem. If we insist that the distribution of
1signals is given and vary the bidder valuation from Vi = xi to Vi = u(xi).
The conditions to ﬁnd an appropriate u( ) are however harder to be met.
2 The model
We consider ﬁrst-price sealed bid auctions. There are n bidders with inde-
pendent private values and each bidders’ signal are in the interval [0, ¯ v]. We
consider distribution of bidders signals in the set
F = {F : [0, ¯ v] → [0,1];F is continuous strictly increasing and onto}.
Thus F is the set of strictly increasing distributions with support [0, ¯ v]. Let
F ∈ F be the distribution of bidder i ≤ n signal xi. If bidder i has signal xi
he valuates the object as Vi = xi. Deﬁne bF (0) = 0 and if x ∈ (0, ¯ v],
bF (x) = x −
R x
0 F n−1 (v)dv
F n−1 (x)
.
We ﬁrst prove the
Lemma 1 bF is continuous and strictly increasing.
Proof: The continuity of bF for x′ > 0 is immediate. At x′ = 0 it follows
from bF (x) < x. Let us now prove that it is strictly increasing. Suppose that
0 ≤ x < y ≤ ¯ v. If x = 0 it is immediate from
R y
0 F n−1 (v)dv < F n−1 (y)y
that bF (y) > 0 = bF (x). If x > 0 then:
bF (y) − bF (x) = y −
R y




0 F n−1 (u)du
F n−1 (x)
=
y − x −
R y












n−1 (u)du > 0.
Note that
R y
x F n−1 (u)du ≤ F n−1 (y)(y − x). QED
We now show that bF is an equilibrium bidding function.
Proposition 1 Let F ∈ F. If there are n bidders with independent signals
distributed accordingly to F then bF ( ) is a symmetric equilibrium of the
ﬁrst-price auction.
2Proof: Deﬁne b = bF and x = xi. Suppose bidder j  = i with signal xj bids
























Pr(b(x) ≥ b(xj)) =
Y
j =i




























n−1 (u)du ≥ (x − y)F
n−1 (y).
Considering separately the cases x > y and y ≥ x we see that this inequality
is true. QED
Deﬁne
B = {bF ( );F ∈ F}.
We may now prove our main theorem.
Theorem 1 Suppose b : [0, ¯ v] → R . Then b ∈ B if and only if:
1. b( ) is strictly increasing;
2. b(0) = 0;
3. b(x) < x if x > 0;





3Proof: Suppose b ∈ B. It is clear that it satisﬁes (1), (2) and (3). To see




F n−1 (y) R y



























0 F n−1 (v)dv
R x









0 F n−1 (v)dv
F n−1 (x)
R ¯ v
0 F n−1 (v)dv
R x
0 F n−1 (v)dv
=
R ¯ v
0 F n−1 (v)dv
F n−1 (x)
.
Thus b satisfy (4). Now suppose b( ) satisfy (1), (2), (3) and (4). I show














First note that (4) imply that G is continuous at 0. And obviously G(¯ v) = 1.
It is also clear that G is continuous if x > 0. We now show that G is strictly
increasing. It is equivalent to prove that
φ(x) := logG





dy − log(x − b(x))
is strictly increasing. If h > 0 then




















x+h−b(x+h) ≥ 1 then












x−b(x) > 1, then
log
µ










h − b(x + h) + b(x)
x − b(x)
4and therefore




























φ(x + h) − φ(x)
h
≥ 0
which implies that φ is increasing. To show that it is strictly increasing
suppose not. Then φ is constant in an interval (c,d) and therefore it is













we have that b′ (x) = 0 if x ∈ (c,d) and this contradicts that b( ) is strictly
increasing. It remains only to check that










































































= x − (x − b(x)) = b(x).
QED















If n = 3 then G(x) =
√
x.
53 The model with a more general valuation
Suppose now that the set of signals of bidder i is an abstract probability space
(X,T ,P) and if bidder i has a signal xi ∈ X his valuation is Vi = u(xi) where
u : X → [0, ¯ v]. If the distribution
Fu (l) = Pr(u(x) ≤ l),l ∈ [0, ¯ v]
belongs to F then we can easily see that
bu (x) = bFu (u(x)) (1)
is a symmetric equilibrium bidding function.
Is it possible to ﬁx a distribution F and vary the valuation u( ) to obtain
a pre-speciﬁed bidding function b( )? Suppose the set of signals is X = [0, ¯ v]
with distribution F (x) with a continuous density f (x) > 0. Then we have
the
Theorem 2 Suppose b : [0, ¯ v] → R is continuously diﬀerentiable, strictly
increasing such that b(0) = 0 and
u(x) = b(x) +









Then b( ) is the symmetric equilibrium of the ﬁrst-price auction if bidders
have valuation Vi (x) = u(x) and the distribution of signals is F.
Proof: First note that Fu (u(x)) = F (x) and therefore using (1) that


















0 (b(l)F n−1 (l))
′ dl
F n−1 (x)
= b(x).
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